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Unipolarity and Foreign Policy: 
An Examination Of The Unipolar U.S And Its Subsequent Foreign Policy Constraints 
Maddie Smith  
 
 
The modern world has been characterized by the structure of U.S unipolarity within the 
international system for almost 30 years now. Many scholars like Kenneth Waltz saw this as a 
fleeting moment that was sure to fall prey to counterbalancing and would never last. However, 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, the international system indeed has remained unipolar, with 
the U.S as the unipole. During the era of the Cold War, neorealists often characterized the 
structure of bipolarity as the most stable and the one that would prevent great power conflict. 
However, as we have transitioned out of that system into our modern day circumstances, with the 
U.S at the lead, this makes the question of what comes next particularly intriguing. As history 
has shown, no polarity balance, whether bi, multi, or uni polarity has lasted forever. But this has 
been the first case in which unipolarity has existed in a time characterized by modern nuances 
such as nuclear warfare, non-state actors, and the modern nation-state balance.  
Great power conflict is something that has more dire consequences now than it perhaps 
did in the 19th and 20th centuries.  As such, the transition from being on top to perhaps once again 
in a power competition with other nations is a coming reality fraught with uncertainty, especially 
in the foreign policy community. The result of the unipolar moment has been the U.S’s 
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capitalization on being the unipole and subsequently the international system has been structured 
according to how we saw fit. Our foreign policy has also reflected the constraints and benefits of 
being the unipole for over two decades now. The U.S has almost in a way structured its ultimate 
grand strategy goals around maintaining this structure of unipolarity, despite that actually being 
out of any one state’s control.  
Despite the surface level benefits that may be potentially reaped from the U.S’s status as 
the unipole, it is now increasingly predicted that a coming polarity shift is imminent in the form 
of a rising China. Since the early 80’s China’s GDP has risen at a rate of almost 10% per year 
following the series of economic reforms. As the country has continued to rival the U.S 
economic strength and even surpass it in 2014 in purchasing power according to data found from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook database, scholars are quick to note that this trend is one of 
the major ways in which neorealists tend to gauge power. In neorealist conceptions of what it 
means to be a “superpower” vs. a “great power”, generally it is accepted that countries with 
strong economies, substantial land space, large populations, and regional power are the 
foundational steps often need to transition from a “great power” to a “superpower”. Of course as 
is also neorealist tradition, there is no hard and fast rule to exactly what makes a “superpower” or 
“great power”, or what the magic formula may be to transition from one or the other; but as 
China continues to grow in the foundational areas of typical power components, it is easy to see 
why this is causing the world some unease.  
Before one can discuss the potential polarity shifts, it is important to establish that the 
world is in fact unipolar at this moment in time and has been since about the fall of the Soviet 
Union, if not perhaps slightly before as well. According to William Wohlforth’s 1999 article 
“The Stability of a Unipolar World'' the United States “ enjoys a much larger margin of 
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superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than 
any leading state in the last two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the first leading state in 
modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of 
power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical. To describe this unprecedented 
quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent "moment" is profoundly 
mistaken” (Wohlforth, 1999). Since this article was published, this observation has remained 
over the last two decades, but scholars still disagreed over whether or not this observation was 
true and the system was truly unipolar. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will be 
agreeing with Wohlforth and other scholars’ assessment of current unipolarity with the United 
States as the only superpower within the system.  
The current unipolar system for the purposes of this paper is undeniable, but also 
undeniably going to shift in the future. Yet as unipolarity has persisted, the U.S has made many 
foreign policy and grand strategy decisions based on the structural constraints and flexibilities of 
being the unipole. This trend may not be an advisable one should a shift in power occur. My 
question is, should the system return to bi or multipolarity, how will U.S foreign policy be able 
to accommodate these changes peacefully after it has so long been centered around maintaining 
the unipolar system and its current status? Additionally how will the U.S negotiate other rising 
powers, once they do rise enough to present real challenges to the status quo? Essentially seeing 
as China is the clear candidate for being the fastest rising power, how will the U.S navigate its 
relationship to avoid returning to an era reminiscent of Cold War tensions. The aim of this thesis 
is to do a literature review from the book “International Relations and the Consequences of 




A Structure Analysis 
In Jervis’s article, he starts by discussing some key questions that scholars must ask 
themselves for a structural analysis of the unipolar system and its definition. It is well known that 
the unipole does not have control over outcomes, but Jervis says a good litmus test to explore 
this relationship between capabilities and power is to actually look at how often the 
unipole  actually gets what it wants. This is to help address the two different definitions of the 
unipolar system; one marked by just capabilities and the other defined by total security for the 
unipole. Both are linked by the underlying assumption that the privileged position of the unipole 
leads to security. This is a difficult assumption to verify seeing that capabilities and power are 
not entirely straightforward and even despite a state having sufficient capabilities and power, this 
may not entirely enable the state to reach all of their objectives, should their values or behavior 
be found unacceptable by the international community.  
Essentially Jervis argues that unipolar systems hinge largely on what unipoles desire as 
they grow and the desires depend largely on the specific idiosyncrasies of whichever 
superpower. Unipolar systems thus are nonidentical.  As Jervis explains for the implications of 
the specific unipole characteristic on its control over objectives, “Whether others will comply 
also depends on nonstructural factors, especially the coincidence of discrepancy between the 
worlds they prefer and the one sought by the superpower. Of course the actors’ preferences may 
themselves be subject to influence, and we would expect the unipole to make serious efforts to 
persuade or coerce…the others to develop goals, values, and beliefs that are compatible with its 
own. Indeed inducing such a consciousness…is over the long run the cheapest and most secure 
form of influence. Whether these efforts will succeed depends in large part on how compatible 
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the unipole’s objectives are with those of the others and the skill with which it acts” (Jervis, pg. 
257).  
This observation also leads to the related question of which threats actually challenge the 
security of a unipole. Jervis points out that traditional theories tie the longevity of the unipole to 
the economy, due to the fact that a strong economy is needed to protect the cost of its position. 
Yet he notes should the unipole be able to profit off its position, the unipolar structure is largely 
self-sustaining. While this observation is not enough to protect the unipole completely from 
instability (it does not protect the unipole from economic shocks) it does however represent a 
bigger break from past systems by  “take[ing] states out of anarchy and transforms if not 
dissolves international politics in two related ways. First security concerns are greatly reduced 
for the unipole and others it protects….second some of the relations under unipolarity will 
embody a degree of hierarchy...the unipole cannot dictate but it can set at least some of the rules 
and can enforce agreements among others (although it itself cannot be bound)” (Jervis, pg. 258-
259).  
Essentially, the result from the years under unipolarity has been a  shift from past 
unipolar systems like those of ancient Rome or China, to one where the U.S is calling the shots 
and organizing the international system. Unlike past unipolar systems, the current one is 
characterized by modern developments like nuclear weapons, liberal values and more of a 
“security community” stemming from the high cost of modern war. It is also largely defined by 
the characteristics of the U.S itself in values, politics, and outlook. According to Jervis 
structuralist claims analyzing the system say any unipole would behave as the U.S has due to the 
constraints inherent in the system. But as Jervis has already mentioned, to expect unipolarity to 
look the same under different regimes like the USSR or China is to ignore the fact that it is 
 6 
extremely difficult to separate the impact of the “soft power” influences exported by the unipole. 
America’s insistence on democracy or liberal values does not reflect prudent statecraft in 
response to structure, but indeed reflects how under unipolarity the internal factors like regime 
and individual president attitudes may matter more than external factors. 
Jervis discusses this by analyzing the Iraq war and the idea that has somewhat dictated 
American foreign policy, which is the attitude of to “be complacent is to allow alternative 
powers to rise” (Jervis, 272). The most extreme example of this attitude is the Iraq war in which 
the U.S and its allies felt it was best to take preventative steps in the form of war. This type 
foreign policy driven by American values like democracy promotion, has continued to steer the 
direction of foreign policy well past its initiation in President Bush’s term. The intensity has 
lessened as Jervis notes, but even under the Obama administration more troops were still sent to 
Afghanistan with the goal of democratization in the region.  As Jervis best explains, “the current 
lack of a superpower competitor has not made the U.S comfortable with other kinds of regimes” 
(Jervis, 272). The structure of unipolarity has made the U.S brand of unipole power almost 
desirable to other countries despite any overreach in its foreign policy. It has also created a 
deeply mistrustful U.S that is uninterested in anything other than perpetuating the current status 
quo.  
The regimes of the Middle East did not present any real threat like that of China, but they 
were still enough to encourage policies that at their heart wanted to keep the influx of American 
power stable. Yet even with the perhaps irrational and ambitious self interested foreign policy 
that came out of the Bush era, no legitimate balancing coalitions have formed against the U.S. As 
I had previously mentioned, instead of leading powers acting in ways balance of power theory 
would predict to unite against American unipolar power, they have formed a “security 
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community” as Jervis coins it. Indeed while Jervis also points out the fact that neither China nor 
Russia are a part of this security community, neither country has attempted to unite in order to 
balance against the unipole either-contrary to what balance of power theorists would predict.  
Jervis attributes this trend to the oversight balance of power theory does not account for 
which is, what happens once the unipole is already established. The theory makes predictions 
that states will form coalitions in order to help prevent a hegemon from completing it’s full rise, 
but it doesn’t convincingly speak of what happens after unipolarity is already in effect. “What is 
equally crucial is that balance of power dynamics arise in the context of the use, threat, and fear 
of force. But as we have seen, the leading powers now form a security community. The 
incentives to try to overturn unipolarity are much less when states do not fear that the 
superpower will invade them or greatly diminish their sovereignty. Indeed, if they believe that 
the unipole will provide a degree of order and public goods and that rivalry would be 
destabilizing, they may actively support unipolarity. While self-interest may underlie the Bush 
administration’s argument that the rise of any other country or group of countries to challenge 
the US would lead to conflict if it failed and to instability if it succeeded, the claim may be 
correct and/or may be seen as such by many other countries. The record of bipolarity and 
multipolarity is not attractive…cautious men and women might not opt to run the experiment” 
(Jervis, 275). 
 
Legitimacy and Hypocrisy Under Unipolarity  
 The U.S has made foreign policy decisions based on the structure of unipolarity and the 
certain ways the structure of the system has caused the U.S to react in response. One way in 
which unipolarity has helped dictate certain decisions, stems from the role legitimacy and 
hypocrisy play in a unipolar system as Finnemore discusses in her article. Often overlooked by 
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the more material aspects of a unipole’s power such as military capabilities or economic 
strength, Finnemore explains how, “material force alone remains to impose order, and order 
creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even under unipolarity. Successful and stable 
orders require the grease of some legitimation structure to persist and prosper…unipoles attempt 
to articulate some set of values and shared interests that induce acquiescence or support from 
others, thereby legitimating their power and policies…acceptance by or overt support from 
others makes exercise of power by the unipole cheaper and more effective” (Finnemore, 72). 
 Since the U.S rise to preponderance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this notion of 
a need for legitimacy and the pushing of shared values, has been a core component of the U.S 
brand of foreign policy and international conduct. By pushing values like open markets, the U.S 
was able to develop “public goods” such as international economic institutions, like the IMF, 
which in turn are key players in the U.S grand strategy of institutionalizing it’s power. As 
Finnemore notes, it is no coincidence that “current systemic rules demand open markets and free 
trade” (80) and this norm in turn reciprocally benefits the U.S economy. International authority 
has essentially resulted from the U.S transformation of its power into these institutions, 
simultaneously legitimizing the United States and most of its objectives in one fell swoop.  
The U.S is a strong unipole due to the way it has positioned itself into championing 
universal values, despite the ultimate hypocrisy that does follow this sort of rule setting. Great 
power requires this sort of great legitimacy, and the U.S was able to create its current standing 
due not only to its rise to the unipole status, but also due to the efforts stemming from the Cold 
War values promotion in its sphere of influence. “The U.S was a vocal (if not always consistent) 
proponent of freedom, democracy, and human rights. It built and extended institutional 
architecture designed to shape global politics in ways that both served its interest and propagated 
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its values. So successful was the U.S at legitimating and institutionalizing its power that, by the 
time the Berlin Wall fell, other models of political and economic organization had largely 
disappeared. The U.S-favored liberal model of free markets and democracy became the model 
choice for states around the world not through overt U.S coercion, but in significant part because 
states had accepted it as the best (ergo most legitimate) way to run a country” (Finnmore, 97).  
This observation from Finnemore about not only the importance legitimacy has for the 
achievement of power, but also the groundwork that was laid prior to the U.S’s rise is key to 
helping look at the question of returning to an era of bipolarity with China. Currently the 
legitimacy is centered most predominantly on the U.S as is to be expected from the result of the 
system structuring. But should bipolarity reemerge, it would not be unthinkable to expect the 
same sort of ploys from China that the U.S executed during the Cold War. However, a key 
difference I think from the Cold War era, to modern day would be the fact that authority and 
legitimacy of the current U.S led system have already been accepted by many states. China’s 
main hurdle would be to present a viable alternative to what is already in place and accepted by 
the current international community. 
 Thus should we return to a bipolar system, U.S foreign policy would be largely dictated 
to the upkeep of its unipolar legitimacy and the institutions that cemented its power. It should be 
noted however, that this current undermining of U.S legitimacy has already begun in several 
small steps from China, most notably AIIB. As unipolarity becomes more costly and demanding, 
we should expect more viable Chinese alternatives to U.S led institutions to become a reality. 
Yet the question of how the U.S and indeed the rest of the world will react, as the shattering of 
stable authority occurs from these alternatives, remains to be seen.  
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The AIIB, otherwise known as the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank, is China’s 
answer to the IMF and is the result of China’s dynamic economic growth that occurred over the 
last decade. This development coupled with another Chinese initiative called the Belt and Road 
initiative is indicative of China’s first concrete steps towards potentially building foundations for 
spheres of influence with neighboring countries in Asia. The initiatives were originally met with 
concern from the American side, and there was an effort from U.S politicians to dissuade allies 
like South Korea, Australia, and the United Kingdom from joining the AIIB. Yet even despite 
the U.S efforts, these countries did end up joining the AIIB anyways. These developments 
obviously could pose a real challenge to U.S influence and investment in Asia, due to the fact 
that the U.S also has vested trade agreements in the region through the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). However, as David Dollar points out in his article, these sort of developments should not 
be interpreted as a signal of real power or challenge as of yet due to the nature of the Chinese 
initiatives being more of the  
“‘hardware’ of trade and investment, necessary but not sufficient to deepen integration. 
TPP, on the other hand, represents the ‘software’ of integration, reducing trade barriers, opening 
up services for trade and investment, and harmonizing various regulatory barriers to trade. There 
is a risk that the competing initiatives of China and the United States will lead to regional blocs 
and a disintegration of trade, but it is more likely that Sino-American competition will lead to 
strengthened institutions and deeper integration throughout Asia-Pacific” (Dollar, 2015). There is 
sympathy for China as an alternative institution builder in the region however, as Dollar already 
points out the U.S should be more inclined to see the AIIB as a complement to the current 




Unipolarity and Competition 
 Perhaps the most pressing issue for this question of unipolar U.S foreign policy adjusting 
to a bipolar system in the future, is the looming question of how do we prevent great power war 
or even conflict during the transition. Wohlforth’s article addresses this topic by discussing the 
role status, competition has to play in conflict in addition to discussing how dissatisfaction with 
the status quo may be affected by different levels of material capabilities. Looking into the 
theories of war, this will help illuminate the question of what may actually lead to war in the 
current age of nuclear deterrence and increased costs for the price of great power conflict.  
 The first question Wohlforth discusses in his article is what makes a rising state begin to 
challenge the status quo, or even be dissatisfied with it to begin with. He notes how historically 
and indeed even now, challenger states seemed to thrive and prosper under the very status quos 
they rose to challenge. China’s economy is almost the strongest and the world, and in the 
international system it is a major player in all decisions and major institutions and their councils. 
What would cause China dissatisfaction that pushes it to mount a really challenge to U.S led 
unipolarity?  Wohlforth discusses the role perception and status has to do with state 
dissatisfaction and mentions how often the importance of “a place in the sun” for states such as 
China really does impact decisions around war and statecraft. “In each paradigmatic case of 
hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of 
the status quo…Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats 
not the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which 
was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war…in post Westphalian Europe, the 
rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of 
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the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and 
status” (Wohlforth, 37).  
 This aspect of hegemonic wars is alarmingly overlooked in the traditional theories around 
rising states and causes of war. However, it may have even more of a place in today’s era, where 
the extreme stratification of states due to the structure of unipolarity, causes inherent hierarchy 
for the international community. The U.S is undeniably at the top for better or for worse and due 
to its position, its high status is guaranteed. Yet unlike bipolarity or multipolarity, the incentives 
for states to compete for elevation of their status is somewhat moot. It is costly to challenge the 
superpower and thus the incentives for direct competition are especially weak. However, as U.S 
power continues to weaken and the international hierarchy becomes more ambiguous, this is 
where Wohforth argues great war could occur over positional competition. ““Dissatisfaction 
arises not from dominance itself but from a dominance that appears to rest on ambiguous 
foundations. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of clear hierarchies in which the 
relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially. Applied 
to international politics, this begins to suggest conditions conducive to status competition. For 
conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it 
dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that 
brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position” (Wohlforth, 
45).  
 Status competition and the need to fight over positional status in an unambiguous 
unipolar system for other states does not exist. However, what should be of great concern to 
policy makers should the U.S find itself slipping back towards a situation of bipolar competition 
with China is that observation from Wohlforth. As U.S power becomes less concrete and finds 
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itself becoming similar to China in capabilities, the chance of China assessing the U.S as a 
comparatively similar state may occur. In turn China may begin looking to overtake it 
positionally due to an increased desire for status, such as the case of Sparta and Athens. The U.S 
of course would then be forced to perform the aforementioned identity-maintenance strategy 
Wohlforth mentions, seeing as it is coming from a place of high status for so long, and will be 
willing to fight China over something so seemingly artificial as position. This state psychology 
should not be underestimated, and especially as scholars make calls for the U.S to accept a return 
to multipolarity, it should be kept in mind the impact a return to these different systems will have 
on positional competition and status for states. The triggers for great power war will not be so 
removed as the once were under the current unipolarity.  
 Additionally it should be noted that China has constantly also favored a narrative of flat 
hierarchy over single state dominance for many years now. Despite the fact that as Wohlforth has 
established, a more stratified hierarchical system is helping to keep the need for great 
competition and conflict over status at bay, China continues to be driven by a desire for great 
power status after it’s “century of shame”. This notion of what is driving China’s desire to rise 
has been long discussed by Western scholars. As Wohlforth mentions, “[China’s] preference for 
multipolarity and periodic resentment at what it sees as the United States’ assertion of special 
rights and privileges is also well established. Chinese analyses of multipolarity explicitly reflect 
the predicted preference for a flat hierarchy over one in what a single state has primacy…while 
many Chinese have convinced themselves that U.S power predominance cannot last, they do 
grudgingly acknowledge the world’s current unipolar nature…as a result Beijing adopted a 
‘peaceful’ rise strategy that downplays the prospect of direct competition for global parity with 
the United States” (Wohlforth, 64).   
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 Wohlforth’s analysis of the role of status pursuit provides a more bleak outlook on a 
coming shift back to bipolarity. Scholars like Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke would argue that 
a satisfied state which catches up with the dominant state through a power transition, should not 
be a cause of war. Given that today’s rising powers have little material dissatisfaction leads to 
scholars agreeing with this sort of analysis and being overly optimistic about rising peer 
competitors. However, these sorts of hypotheses lull scholars and foreign policy analysts into a 
false sense of security. Unipolarity affords the U.S a great many leniencies in its foreign policy 
and privileges in it’s status that would not be afforded to it once it is no longer the unipole. As 
Wohlforth points out it is much harder to manage status competition than any of the material 
factors. “While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, 
theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves 
back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft 
negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is 
particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy…With two or more 
possible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war 
could once again for the backdrop of world politics” (Wohlforth, 66).  
 While China claims a peaceful rise strategy and indeed may be very well intentioned in 
its attempts to carry out that promise, the effect of status competition may be an unavoidable part 
of the transition back to bipolarity. Thus in order to avoid returning to a Cold War tensions era, 
U.S and Chinese foreign policy makers alike will need to recognize this issue not only to avoid 
escalated tensions, but indeed even war. Unlike the material capabilities Thucydides trap that 
played out between the U.S and Soviet Union, the onus to avoid a similar fate with competition 
is rapidly approaching the U.S and China. However the current trend of strongmen politics on 
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the part of both countries recently makes the expectation for being able to manage the 
importance of status for both countries even lower.  
 
 
Transition In Sight  
 Given that the works written by these authors were published almost a decade ago, it is 
important to note how these articles have changed since 2011. As Barry Posen was writing his 
article, unipolarity was just starting to wane. It is important to keep in mind the context these 
articles were written in, because they offer some interesting hypotheses that we can already see 
beginning to unfold, almost ten years after they were made. As Posen argues in his article 
discussing the coming transition to bipolarity or multipolarity, he mentions several different 
countries that are candidates for leading this transition. Most obvious is China, but he also 
mentions the growing power of India and Brazil. Currently it’s hard to say whether these other 
two countries are still clearly in the running for the transition to multipolarity, but it’s safe to say 
that China has acted in much of the ways scholars like Posen predicted, and has started to take 
the full form of a counter challenger to the U.S.  
As China continues to rise, Posen gives an interesting analysis on the way capabilities are 
analyzed by realists. He gives the example of the Soviet Union and the U.S during the Cold War 
and the disparity between their two economic capabilities. He notes how, “The Soviet Union was 
only barely in the US league for most of the Cold War in terms of economic capacity but we 
think of the era as a bipolar order, in part because the gap between the Soviet Union and the third 
ranking power in the immediate aftermath of World War Two was so great…Latent Soviet 
power did exceed that of any actor other than the US…but was barely competitive with the US” 
(Posen, 321).  
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 Latent U.S power still trumps many of the other countries at the moment, but to 
underestimate the weight of China’s economic power is a mistake in a capabilities analysis of the 
two powers. Scholars like Wohlforth have argued that unipolarity is defined by a state who is in 
“a class by itself” but as Posen points out, that definition can be rather difficult to fulfill. Usually 
the ability to be in a class by itself is defined by the lack of counter coalitions against the state in 
question, but again as Posen mentions is the a lack of ability due to arithmetic factors or political 
factors. This analysis shows that the line between unipolarity and bipolarity is a bit more blurry, 
and the major economic trends show an increasingly different future. However, it should be 
noted that even as Posen was predicting the transition to bipolarity he accepted the fact that 
unipolarity was still in effect writing, ““The US still enjoys a very comfortable margin of 
superiority in both extant military power, and the economic underpinnings that make those 
capabilities possible. Additionally, the US has the global diplomatic and military presences, and 
the diplomatic and military skills necessary to manage and sustain a truly global foreign policy, 
if not always successfully. No other nation-state can do so at this time” (Posen, 325).  
 Posen notes how unipolarity was still intact at the time of this article, and most of what he 
observed back in 2011 is still true today. China has been growing its influence and diplomatic 
pull, but it has nowhere near the global reach militarily or diplomatically that the US possesses. 
What should be noted about his observations however, is that fact that instead of hypothesizing 
China as the sole competitor to the U.S, Posen offers a different theory where China forms a 
coalition with another strong power to effectively overcome the U.S in combined capabilities and 
reach. This hypothesis is an important one especially when looking at it from the angle of 
directing U.S foreign policy in the future.  
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Yes it is a possibility that China could rise as a sole competitor to U.S hegemony, but as 
of now it also realistic that China courts and ally of consequential power to rise alongside it as 
well such as Russia, India, or the EU. In response the U.S may ““vigorously [alter] its own 
alliance relationships….at the same time these partners may also have other alliance options. A 
strong incentive to compete for allies would be a mark of a multipolar system, even if the US 
were still the number one power by a significant margin” (Posen, 327). This potential reality 
highlights even further that unipolarity is on the wane, but not necessarily US power. The 
predicted reality of a sole China competition has eclipsed this other foreign policy possibility that 
the rise of China may cause the U.S to prepare for, especially in terms of changing alliance 
structures in the coming years. Especially after the Trump presidency, it will be a key time to 
revisit the current allies of the US and renew their trust in our partnerships. Should the 
partnerships continue to be alienated as they have been in recent years, it is not a stretch to 





As we continue to move towards a future where U.S preponderance is less stable, it will 
continue to be important for scholars and policy makers to keep the ideas discussed in this paper 
in mind. The goal of this paper is to help show the coming hurdles US foreign policy is going to 
need to adapt to in the future, as well as discuss the coming tensions that may arise from shifts in 
status and alliances. The US has grown complacent in its position over the last twenty years. The 
system structured as it saw fit, will see disruption as rising powers or coalitions start to make real 
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efforts towards either counterbalancing against the US or seeking to take its as the sole 
superpower in the system.  
At the current moment, as previously discussed, I would not say unipolarity is completely 
over. We have one strong power in the form of China who will present a challenge to the U.S in 
the coming years and will soon surpass the U.S economically. But the U.S still maintains a 
military and diplomatic geopolitical hold on more of the world than does China or any other 
rising power. Whether or not we will return to an era of Cold War tensions or even enter a hot 
war in the future as perhaps a struggle ensues for security and status is currently unknown and 
hard to predict. This is the issue the U.S is positioned best to help prevent however, if it can 
recognize the coming obstacles. Creating foreign policy now that will be better suited to a 
different power balance in the future will help ensure that the world does not return to an era of 
intense militarized bipolar tensions. Instead by recognizing the position and power of rising 
powers, the U.S will be better equipped to adjust its grand strategy goals and readjust the sails as 
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